Profesor Asistente Área de Economía y Finanzas y del Centro de Gobierno Corporativo y Sociedad, ESE Business School


Área de Interés

Dirección Financiera, Gobierno Corporativo y Directorios


¿Quién es?

Soy profesor asistente en el ESE Business School, donde también participo del Centro de Gobierno Corporativo y Sociedad. Obtuve mi doctorado en Finanzas en el Stanford Graduate School of Business de Stanford University. Antes de incorporarme al ESE, fui profesor asistente por 7 años en la Escuela de Administración de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Soy también director de una compañía del sector financiero.


  • Stanford Graduate School of Business
    Ph.D., Finance, 2015
  • Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
    M.Sc. in Industrial Engineering, 2008
    Industrial Engineer Degree with Major in Electrical Engineering, 2008
    Academic Certificate in Astronomy and Astrophysics, 2008

Publicaciones Destacadas


The limits of hegemony: U.S. banks and Chilean firms in the Cold War

Nov 09, 2023

Economic sanctions and covert actions from hegemonic states are common tools used to influence other countries. Less is known about non-state actors such as banks and their impact across borders. read more

Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Score Auctions in Multi-Attribute Procurement

Sep 01, 2021

Score auctions are used in procurement to incorporate other attributes beyond price. We establish nonparametric econometric identification of bidders' pseudotypes (a measure of bidder's private cost), when bids are evaluated using a preannounced quasi-linear score, calculated on the basis of the submitted levels of the attributes. Hence, we extend the standard nonparametric method for independent private costs sealed-bid, first price auctions, to multi-attribute quasi-linear score auctions. We illustrate the result with an application to scoring bid data.

Privatization and Business Groups: Evidence from the Chicago Boys in Chile

Oct 01, 2020

Business groups are the predominant organizational structure in modern Chile. This article tests the long-standing hypothesis that the privatization reform implemented by the “Chicago Boys” during the Pinochet regime facilitated the creation of new groups and hence the renovation of the country’s elites. Using new data we find that firms sold during this privatization later became part of new business groups, process aided by an economic crisis that debilitated traditional elites. Moreover, some firms were bought by Pinochet’s allies and were later used as providers of capital within groups. We conclude that privatizations can empower outsiders to replace business elites.

Otras publicaciones

Otras publicaciones

  • “Firm Competition and CEO Turnover: Evidence from US Railroad Deregulation”. Financial Management, 47(2), pp. 451-476, 2018.
  • “Consumption and Hedging in Oil-Importing Developing Countries”, with Jaime Casassus.European Financial Management, 18(5), pp. 896-928, 2012.

Working Papers

  • “Shareholder liability and bank failure” with Dirk Jenter (LSE), Arthur Korteweg (USC), and Peter Koudijs (Erasmus). June 2021. R&R Journal of Finance.
  • “Pension Fund Flows, Exchange Rates, and Covered Interest Rate Parity” with Zhi Da (Notre Dame), Borja Larraín (UC Chile), and Clemens Sialm (UT Austin). April 2023.
  • “Do political parties matter for property taxes?” with Cristóbal Díaz (UC) and Santiago Truffa (U. de los Andes). August 2022.

Selected Work in Progress

  • “The Market Response to Mandatory ESG Reporting”, with Jonathan Berkovitch (LUISS Guido Carli University), Doron Israeli (Nazarbayev University and Reichman University) and Mauricio Larraín (UC)
  • “Long Term Dynamics of Corporate, Financial, and Political Elite Networks”, with Matías Braun (ESE Business School).